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Privacy-preserving record linkage with Bloom filters has become increasingly
popular in medical applications, since Bloom filters allow for probabilistic link-
age of sensitive personal data. However, since evidence indicates that Bloom
filters lack sufficiently high security where strong security guarantees are re-
quired, several suggestions for their improvement have been made in literature.
One of those improvements proposes the storage of several identifiers in one
single Bloom filter. In this paper we present an automated cryptanalysis of
this Bloom filter variant. The three steps of this procedure constitute our main
contributions: (1) a new method for the detection of Bloom filter encrytions
of bigrams (so-called atoms), (2) the use of an optimization algorithm for the
assignment of atoms to bigrams, (3) the reconstruction of the original attribute
values by linkage against bigram sets obtained from lists of frequent attribute
values in the underlying population. To sum up, our attack provides the first
convincing attack on Bloom filter encryptions of records built from more than
one identifier.
Keywords: Bloom Filter, Privacy-Preserving Record Linkage, Anonymity,
Hash Function, Cryptographic Attack
1 Introduction
Record linkage between databases containing information on individual people
is popular in a large number of medical applications, for example the identi-
fication of patient deaths [4], the evaluation of disease treatment [10] and the
linkage of cancer registries in epidemiology [18]. In many applications data
sets are merged using personal identifiers such as forenames, surnames, place
and date of birth. Due to privacy concerns this has to be done via privacy-
preserving record linkage (PPRL). However, since personal identifiers often
contain typing or spelling errors, encrypting the identifier values and linking
only those that match exactly does not provide satisfactory results. There-
fore, to allow for errors in encrypted personal identifiers, in many European
countries encrypted phonetic codes, such as Soundex codes, are commonly
used, especially by cancer registries. As the performance of these codes is still
non satisfactory, several novel privacy-preserving record linkage methods have
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been suggested during the last years. For example Schnell et al. [15] devel-
oped a method based on Bloom filters. Bloom-filter-based record linkage has
already been used in medical applications in a number of different countries
[6, 9, 13, 17].
Another frequently applied privacy-preserving record linkage method uses
anonymous linking codes [2]. The basic principle of an anonymous linking
code is to standardize all particular identifiers of a record (removal of certain
characters and diacritics, use of upper case letters), to concatenate them to
a single string and finally to put this single string into a cryptographic hash
function. By combining this principle with Bloom filters, Schnell et al. [16]
first developed a novel error-tolerant anonymous linking code, called Crypto-
graphic Longterm Key (CLK). Instead of encrypting every single identifier from
a record of several identifiers through a Bloom filter, multiple identifiers are
stored in one single Bloom filter, called CLK. Tests on several databases showed
that CLKs yield good linkage properties, superior to well-known anonymous
linking codes [16].
Only recently Randall et al. [13] presented a study on 26 million records
of hospital admissions data and showed that privacy-preserving record linkage
with Bloom filters built from multiple identifiers is applicable to large real-
world databases without loss in linkage quality.
However, only little research on the security of Bloom filters built from more
than one identifier has yet been published (see subsection 2.2). In several
countries, this lack of research prevents the widespread use of Bloom filter
encryptions for real-world medical databases (such as cancer registries) where
the anonymity of the individuals has to be guaranteed. For example, in its
Beyond 2011 Programme the British Office for National Statistics investigated
several methods for linking sensitive data sets [12]. The investigators came to
the conclusion that none of the “(...) recent innovations, such as bloom filter
encryption (...)" can be recommended because they “(...) have not been fully
explored from an accreditation perspective". Thus, research showing draw-
backs of the recent Bloom filter techniques is important because it guides the
direction for future research and might motivate further development of the
recent procedures. In this paper, we intend to investigate this issue in detail
by giving the first convincing cryptanalysis of Bloom filter encryptions built
from more than one identifier.
2 Background
In 1970, Burton Howard Bloom [1] introduced a novel approach that permits
the efficient testing of set membership through a probabilistic space-efficient
data structure. A Bloom filter is a bit array of length L, which at first contains
zeros only. Let S ⊆ U be a subset of a universe U . Then S can be stored in a
Bloom filter B = B(S) = (b0, . . . , bL−1) in the following way: Each element s ∈
S is mapped via k different hash functions h0, . . . , hk−1 : S −→ {0, . . . , L− 1}
and all the corresponding bit positions bh0(s), . . . , bhk−1(s) are set to one. Once
a bit position is set to one this value no longer changes.
Furthermore, to test whether an item u ∈ U from the universe is contained in
S, u is hashed through the k hash functions h0, . . . , hk−1 as well. Consequently,
if all bit positions bh0(u), . . . , bhk−1(u) in the Bloom filter are set to one, then u ∈
2
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S holds with high probability. However, false positive values can occur when
the ones on positions h0(u), . . . , hk−1(u) are caused by two or more different
elements u. Then the test indicates u ∈ S although this is not the case.
Otherwise, if at least one bit position in the two Bloom filters varies, u clearly
is no member of S.
2.1 PPRL with Bloom Filters Built from Multiple Identifiers
In [15] Bloom filters were used in privacy-preserving record linkage for the first
time. This approach was expanded to Cryptographic Longterm Keys in [16].
In common PPRL protocols two data owners A and B agree on a set of iden-
tifiers that occur in both of their databases. Next, these identifiers are stan-
dardized, then padded with blanks at the beginning and the end, and finally
split into substrings of two characters. Each substring of the first identifier
corresponding to a record is mapped to the first Bloom filter via several hash
functions. Afterwards, each substring of the second identifier, corresponding to
the same record, is mapped through another set of hash functions to the first
Bloom filter as well. This procedure is repeated until all identifiers of the first
record are stored in the first Bloom filter. Next, all identifiers corresponding
to the second record of the database are mapped through the utilized hash
functions to a second Bloom filter and so on. Performing this procedure for all
entries of the database results in a set of Bloom filters where each Bloom filter
is built from multiple identifiers. Thus, the similarity of the Bloom filters is
a measure for the similarity of the encoded identifiers. Usually, the linkage of
the two databases is conducted by a third party C.
Because of the specific structure of Bloom filters, record linkage based on
Bloom filters built from multiple identifiers allows for errors in the encrypted
data. Therefore, they can be applied to linking large data sets such as national
medical databases [13].
2.2 Extant Research: Attacks on Bloom Filters of One or More Identifiers
To the best of our knowledge, only two ways of attacking Bloom filters of one
identifier and one way of attacking Bloom filters of multiple identifiers are
known so far.
The first cryptanalysis of Bloom filters was published in 2011. Kuzu et
al. [7] sampled 20,000 records from a voter registration list and encrypted the
substrings of two characters from the forenames through 15 hash functions and
Bloom filters of length 500 bits. Their attack consisted in solving a constraint
satisfaction problem (CSP). Through a frequency analysis of the fornames and
the Bloom filters and by applying their CSP solver to the problem, Kuzu et
al. were able to decipher approximately 11% of the data.
In contrast, Niedermeyer et al. [11] proposed an attack on 10,000 Bloom
filters built from encrypted German surnames that were considered to be a
random sample of a known population. For the generation of the Bloom filters
15 hash functions and Bloom filter length 1,000 were used. Then they con-
ducted a manual attack based on the frequencies of the substrings of length
two, which they derived from the German surnames. Thus, Niedermeyer et
al. deciphered the 934 most frequent surnames of 7,580 different ones, which
corresponds to approximately 12% of the data set. However, their attack is not
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limited to the most frequent names and could be extended to the decipherment
of nearly all names.
In 2012 Kuzu et al. [8] showed an attack on Bloom filters built from multiple
identifiers. They applied their constraint solver to forename and surname, as
well as forename, surname, city and ZIP code, of 50,000 randomly selected
records from the North Carolina voter registration list. However, they were not
able to mount a successful attack. Thus, Kuzu et al. supposed that combining
multiple personal identifiers into a single Bloom filter would offer a protection
mechanism against frequency attacks. Although they suspected that their
attack did not uncover all vulnerabilities of the Bloom filter encodings, they
showed that the CSP for multiple identifiers is intractable to solve by their
constraint solver.
2.3 Our Contribution
In this paper we present a fully automated attack on a database contain-
ing forenames, surnames and the relevant place of birth as well. All records
are considered to be a random sample of a known population. We suppose
that the attacker only knows some publicly available lists of the most com-
mon forenames, surnames and locations. The attack is based on analyzing
the frequencies and the combined occurence of substrings of length two from
the identifiers of these lists. Furthermore, we are interested in recovering as
many identifiers as possible. Our cryptanalysis was implemented using the
programming languages Python and C++.
3 Encryption
In this section some basic notation is introduced and the encrypting procedure
is described.
In record linkage scenarios, strings are usually standardized through trans-
formations such as capitalization of characters or removal of diacritics [14].
After this preprocessing step all strings contain only tokens from some pre-
defined alphabet Σ. Throughout this article, we use the canonical alphabet
Σ := {A, B, . . . , Z, ␣}, where ␣ denotes the padding blank. Thus, for example
the popular German surname Müller is transformed to ␣MUELLER␣ in the pre-
processing step. As usual, we denote substrings of two characters with bigrams
and the set containing all the bigrams with Σ2, i.e.
Σ2 = {␣␣, ␣A, . . . , ␣Z, A␣, . . . , Z␣, AA, . . . , ZZ}.
The Bloom filter encryption of a record from a database is created by storing
the bigram set associated with this record into a Bloom filter. The bigram set
associated with a record is defined as the set containing the bigrams from all
the identifiers. Here, a distinction between the bigrams occuring in different
identifiers is made. Thus, if the set of identifiers is denoted with I, the bigram
set of a record is a subset of I × Σ2.
For example, if we have I = {surname, forename} and the database contains
a record, Peter Müller, the bigram set Srecord associated with this record
would contain the bigrams ␣Pf , PEf , ETf , TEf , ERf , R␣f , ␣Ms, MUs, UEs, ELs,
LLs, LEs, ERs and R␣s (the subscript f indicates the bigrams occuring in the
forename identifier, the subscript s the ones occuring in the surname identifier).
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ERf
h1 h0
h2
. . .
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 999
ERs
. . .
h2
h3
h4 h0
h1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 . . . 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 999
Figure 1: Two different atoms of the bigram ER. These atoms are realized when instances of ER occur in
distinct identifiers.
Next, this bigram set is stored into a Bloom filter (b0, . . . , bL−1) of length L
by means of k independent hash functions
hi : I × Σ2 → {0, . . . , L− 1}
for i = 0, . . . , k − 1. In practice, one could alternatively use different hash
functions hi : Σ2 → {0, . . . , L − 1} for the distinct identifiers in order to
guarantee that the hash values for distinct identifiers are not the same.
Further, as in [11] we introduce the term atom for the specific Bloom filters
which occur as the fundamental building blocks of the encryption method.
Definition 3.1 (Atom). Let L, k ∈ N and some hash functions h0, . . . , hk−1
be defined as above. Then, a Bloom filter
B := (b0, . . . , bL−1) ∈ {0, 1}L
is termed an atom if there exists a bigram β ∈ I × Σ2 such that bj = 1 ⇔
hi(β) = j for some i = 0, . . . , k − 1. Such a Bloom filter is called the atom
realized by the bigram β and denoted with B(β).
Thus, atoms are special Bloom filters. Since each bigram is hashed via each
hi for i = 0, . . . , k − 1, at most k positions in an atom can be set to one.
By combining the atoms of the underlying bigram set of a record with the
bitwise OR operation, the Bloom filter of a record is composed as
B(record) =
∨
β∈Srecord
B(β),
where ∨ denotes the bitwise OR operator.
Note that the same bigram from Σ2 is hashed differently if it occurs in
distinct identifiers. This is illustrated in Figure 1 for the example of the bigram
ER which occurs in the record Peter Müller both in the surname and the
forename identifier.
Mapping each bigram of the forename Peter with k hash functions results
in six atoms; for the surname Müller, we get eight atoms. Thus, the separate
5
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0000100000 . . . 0000000010 B(␣Pf )
∨ 0001000001 . . . 0100000100 B(PEf )
∨ 0101010101 . . . 0001010101 B(ETf )
∨ 0001000010 . . . 0001000010 B(TEf )
∨ 0100010001 . . . 0000000100 B(ERf )
∨ 0101010101 . . . 0000000001 B(R␣f )
0101110111 . . . 0101010111 B(Peter)
0000000100 . . . 0000000001 B(␣Ms)
∨ 0010000000 . . . 0100000000 B(MUs)
∨ 0000100000 . . . 0010000010 B(UEs)
∨ 1000000010 . . . 0010000000 B(ELs)
∨ 0100001000 . . . 0100001000 B(LLs)
∨ 1000000100 . . . 0001000000 B(LEs)
∨ 1001001001 . . . 0000100100 B(ERs)
∨ 0010001000 . . . 0000000010 B(R␣s)
1111101111 . . . 0111101111 B(Müller)
Figure 2: Bloom filters of the forename Peter and the surname Müller, composed of the atoms belonging
to the underlying bigrams.
0101110111 . . . 0101010111 B(Peter)
∨ 1111101111 . . . 0111101111 B(Müller)
1111111111 . . . 0111111111 B(entire record)
Figure 3: The Bloom filter of the record Peter Müller is obtained by applying the bitwise OR operation
to the Bloom filter encryptions of the separate identifiers.
Bloom filters for these identifiers might be composed as illustrated in Figure 2.
The final Bloom filter for the record Peter Müller is composed by appling
the bitwise OR operation to the separate Bloom filter encryptions of the dis-
tinct identifiers. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.
In practice, the Bloom filter encryption of a record might contain a mixture of
string valued identifiers (such as forename, surname or place of birth) and also
numerical identifiers, such as date of birth. However, in this paper we restrict
ourselves to the case of string valued attributes only, albeit our cryptanalysis
proposed below is not limited to such attributes.
Assumptions
In many record linkage scenarios, it is supposed that a semi-trusted third party
conducts the record linkage between two encrypted databases. In this paper we
assume a data set containing Bloom filters built from multiple identifiers that
is sent to a semi-trusted third party. This third party acts as the adversary
and tries to infer as much information as possible from the record encryptions.
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We further suppose that the attacker has knowledge of the encryption process.
For our scenario we generated 100,000 Bloom filters built from standardized
German forenames, surnames and cities according to the distribution in the
population. The identifiers were truncated after the tenth letter, padded with
blanks, respectively, and were broken into bigrams. Then the bigrams were
hashed through k = 20 hash functions into Bloom filters of length L = 1, 000.
As proposed in [15] and [16], we used the so-called double hashing scheme for
the generation of k hash functions from two hash functions f and g. This
double hashing scheme is defined via the equation
hi = (f + i · g) mod L for i = 0, . . . , k − 1 (1)
and was originally proposed in [5] as a simple hashing method for Bloom filters
yielding satisfactory performance results.
In our cryptanalysis we assume that the adversary knows that the hash
values are generated in accordance with equation (1). It is self-evident that
s/he must not have direct access to the hash functions f and g since this would
permit the adversary to check whether a specific bigram is contained in a given
Bloom filter.
Note that the double hashing scheme has also been used for the generation
of Bloom filters by Kuzu et al. [8]. However, in that paper the knowledge of
the double hashing scheme was not exploited in their cryptanalysis.
4 Cryptanalysis
This section provides a detailed description of the deciphering process. At
first we try to detect the atoms that are contained in the given Bloom filters.
Then, we assign bigrams to these atoms by means of an optimization algorithm.
Finally, the original attributes are reconstructed from the atoms.
Our approach for the development of a fully automated attack is based on
previous results on the automated cryptanalysis of simple substitution ciphers
presented by Jakobsen [3]. We give a short account of Jakobsen’s results in
order to motivate our procedure.
4.1 Automated Cryptanalysis of Simple Substitution Ciphers
The encryption of a plaintext message through a simple substitution cipher
is defined by a permutation of the underlying alphabet Σ. For instance, the
message HELLO␣LISBON with tokens from the alphabet Σ = {␣, A, B, . . . , Z}
could be encrypted as RVUUYJUOWAYL.
It is well known that this kind of encryption can be broken easily by means
of a frequency analysis. However, just replacing the i-th frequent character in
the ciphertext with the i-th frequent character in the underlying language will
usually not lead to the correct decipherment (even for longer messages). This
is commonly compensated for by taking bigram frequencies into consideration
as well.
The expected bigram frequencies can be obtained from a training data set
composed of the underlying language and stored in a quadratic matrix E (in
the above example a 27×27 matrix), where the entry eij is equal to the relative
proportion of the bigram cicj in the training text corpus and ci denotes the
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i-th character of the alphabet. Analogously, the bigram frequencies of the
ciphertext can be stored in a matrix D.
The algorithm proposed by Jakobsen [3] was intended to find a permutation
σopt of the alphabet such that the objective function f defined via
f(σ) :=
∑
i,j
|dσ(i)σ(j) − eij | (2)
was minimized. The algorithm starts with the initial permutation that reflects
the best assignment between single characters in the plaintext and the cipher-
text with respect to their relative frequency. In each step of the algorithm two
elements of the currently best permutation σopt are swapped, leading to a new
candidate permutation σ. If f(σ) < f(σopt) holds, the current permutation is
updated to σ, otherwise σ is discarded and a new candidate σ is generated by
swapping two other elements of σopt. This is repeated until no swap leads to
a further improvement of the objective function f . Throughout this paper we
use the same strategy as Jakobsen in [3], in order to determine the elements
of the current permutation to be swapped. For a more detailed description
of Jakobsen’s method in the case of simple substitution ciphers we refer the
reader to the original paper [3]. Figure 2 in [3] shows that a ciphertext of
length 600 built by a simple substitution cipher can be entirely broken by this
method. It is clear that some modification of Jakobsen’s original algorithm
is necessary in order to make it applicable in our setting as well. In particu-
lar, the definitions of the matrices D and E must be changed. Their adopted
definitions are introduced in subsection 4.3.
4.2 Atom Detection
As in [11], the basic principle of our approach consists in the detection of
atoms, which represent the encryption of one single bigram only. Since the
Bloom filter of a string is created by the superposition of at least a few atoms,
the reconstruction of the atoms given only a set of Bloom filters turns out to
be difficult. Note that this task cannot be solved in a satisfactory manner if
Bloom filters are considered isolatedly or in small groups because in this case
too many binary vectors will be wrongly classified as atoms.
Let us give a short motivation for our novel method aiming at atom detec-
tion. If the bitwise AND operation is applied to a set of Bloom filters that
have one bigram β in common, at least all positions set to one by β are equal
to one in the result. However, for prevalent bigrams it should be expected that
all the other positions are set to zero if a sufficient number of Bloom filters are
considered, i.e., the result would be exactly the atom induced by the bigram
β.
Of course, if an adversary has access to a set of Bloom filters, s/he does not
a priori know which Bloom filters have a bigram in common. This obstacle can
be avoided as follows: Under the assumption that the double hashing scheme
is being used, the adversary is able to determine for each combination of bit
positions from equation (1) the set of Bloom filters for which all these positions
are set to 1. Then, the bitwise AND operation is applied to the set of these
Bloom filters. If the result coincides with the atom, it is considered to be the
realization of a bigram by the adversary.
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Figure 4: Absolute frequencies of the 10 most frequent bigrams in our training data set.
The resulting set of atoms was further reduced by discarding atoms of Ham-
ming weight ∑999i=0 bi equal to 1, 2, 4 or 5 and keeping only atoms of Hamming
weight equal to 8, 10 or 20.
Otherwise, too many binary vectors would have been classified incorrectly
as atoms. The probability that an atom has Hamming weight less than 8 in
our setting is equal to 0.008. This value can be derived in analogy to Lemma
A.1 and the subsequent example in [11]. We denote the number of atoms
found by n. For our specific data set we got n = 1,776. This result seems
reasonable, because the total number of possible atoms is bounded from above
by 2,187 and obviously not all of these atoms, in particular atoms realized by
rare bigrams, occur in our simulated data. For each atom α we determined
the set of Bloom filters containing this atom, i.e. Bloom filters for which all
bit positions of the atom are set to 1. We denote the atoms with α1, . . . , α1776
according to decreasing frequency.
In the subsequent section we explain how correlations between the occurences
of atoms in the Bloom filters and bigrams in a training data set can be used
to give adequate definitions of the matrices D and E that serve as the input
of Jakobsen’s algorithm.
4.3 Correlation of Atoms and Bigrams
A naive assignment of bigrams to atoms is possible only for few frequent bi-
grams. For example, if German surnames, given names and birth locations
are considered together, the most frequent bigram is A␣f (the bigram A␣ in
the forename identifier) such that the most frequent atom is likely to be the
encryption of this bigram. The absolute frequencies of the 10 most frequent
bigrams in the considered training data are illustrated in Figure 4.
Exept for the first few bigrams, the bigram frequencies are too close together
such that naive matching is not promising for automatic decipherment. For
this reason, we also took correlations between bigrams into account. For ex-
ample, for records sampled from the population of Germany the appearance
of the bigram CHs in a record makes the appearance of the bigram SCs in the
same record more likely because the trigram SCH frequently appears in German
surnames.
9
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We model this kind of information on the correlation of atoms and bigrams
by means of two matrices D and E. Assume that the attribution values of
the records built from tokens of the alphabet Σ = {␣, A, B, . . . , Z} are to be en-
crypted. Thus, for each (string valued) identifier we have 729 possible bigrams.
Since the same bigram is encrypted differently for each identifier we have to
distinguish between different instances of the same bigram. In our setting we
denote the bigram β for the surname, forename and location identifier with βs,
βf and βl, respectively. Altogether, the set Σ2 containing all possible bigrams
consists of 3 · 729 = 2,187 elements.
Let us now introduce the matrix E containing information about the ex-
pected bigram correlations obtained from the training data set. Note that the
training data should be as similar to the encrypted data as possible, e.g. a
random sample from the same underlying population as the encrypted data. If
the prevailing Bloom filters are known to contain encryptions of records from
the German population, an attacker would try to get access to a comparable
database containing the same identifiers. The attribute values of this train-
ing data set are preprocessed analogously to the preprocessing routine before
the encryption process. Then, the bigram sets for all the attribute values are
created. We denote the bigrams with β1, . . . , β2187 according to decreasing fre-
quency. Let T be the total number of records in the training data set and tij
the number of records that contain both bigram βi and bigram βj . Then the
matrix E = (eij)i,j=1,...,2187 is defined via
eij =
{
tij/T if i 6= j,
0 if i = j.
The matrix D is formed in a similar way on the basis of joint appearances
of atoms in the Bloom filters. Let N be the number of Bloom filters for which
atoms have been extracted. We denote the number of Bloom filters that contain
both atom αi and atom αj by bij . The matrix D = (dij)i,j=1,...,2187 is defined
through
dij =
{
bij/N if i 6= j and i, j ≤ 1776,
0 if i = j or max(i, j) > 1776.
The procedure suggested by Jakobsen which was described above can now
directly be applied to the matrices D and E. The pseudocode for the overall
algorithm can be found in algorithm 1.
The progress of the optimization algorithm is illustrated by means of Fig-
ure 5.
The result of the algorithm will be the final assignment between atoms
and bigrams defined by a permutation σopt ∈ S2187 and the assignment rule
ασopt(i) → βi. This assignment is used to reconstruct the original bigram sets
encrypted in the Bloom filters.
For example, the bigrams HEl, E␣l, ␣Kl, RLl, ARl, LSl, RUl, KAl, UHl, SRl, ERs,
R␣s, CHs, SCs, HEs, ␣Fs, ISs, IDs, FIs, N␣f , ␣Sf , ONf , SIf , IMf and MOf were
assigned to the Bloom filter No. 850.
In the following section we describe how attribute values are reassembled
from the reconstructed bigram sets.
10
Contribution to the 8th International Conference on Health Informatics, Lisbon 2015
Algorithm 1 Optimization algorithm
Input: D,E as defined in section 4.3
Output: σopt ∈ S2187 minimizing
f(σ) =
∑
i,j
|dσ(i)σ(j) − eiej |
1: σopt(i) = i ∀i . Initialization
2: min← f(σopt)
3: a, b← 1
4: repeat
5: σ ← σopt
6: a← a+ 1
7: if a+ b ≤ 2187 then
8: σ(a)← σopt(b), σ(b)← σopt(a)
9: else
10: a← 1, b← b+ 1
11: if f(σ) < f(σopt) then . Update
12: min← f(σ)
13: σopt ← σ
14: a, b← 1
15: until b = 2187
4.4 Reconstruction of Attribute Values
In order to reconstruct the original attribute values of the records, we separated
the bigrams belonging to different identifiers for each Bloom filter. Then, our
approach to reconstructing the original identifier values was to compare the
obtained bigram sets with a list of bigram sets generated from reference lists
of surnames, names and locations. For Bloom filter No. 850, for example,
an adversary would correctly guess that this Bloom filter encrypts a record
belonging to the person Simon Fischer from the German city Karlsruhe.
4.5 Results
By using the approach described above, we were able to reconstruct 59.6% of
the forenames, 73.9% of the surnames and 99.7% of the locations correctly.
For 44% of the 100, 000 records all the identifier values were recuperated suc-
cessfully.
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
Updating step
150
200
250
300
350
400
f(
σ
op
t)
Progress of the optimization algorithm
Figure 5: Progress of the optimization algorithm for our data set. The initial value of the objective function
is 370.99 and 2,812 updating steps were performed. The final value of the objective function
f(σopt) was equal to 168.5.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we demonstrate a successful fully automated attack on Bloom
filters built from multiple identifiers. We were able to recover approximately
77.7 % of the original identifier values. In contrast to the assumptions in [8] and
[11], that storing all identifiers in a single Bloom filter makes it more difficult
to attack, we needed only moderate computational effort and publicly available
lists of forenames, surnames, and locations to reconstruct the identifiers. Note
that there is no huge impact of the size of the database containing the Bloom
filters. For our cryptanalysis it is sufficient to perform the attack on a subset of
the given Bloom filters (100,000 as in our example should be adequate in most
cases). Then for the remaining Bloom filters it would be sufficient to check for
the atoms contained in those and to reconstruct the attribute values, since most
assignments of atoms to bigrams are already known. Thus, the time needed for
cryptanalysis is linear in the number of input Bloom filters. The time needed
for the detection of atoms is O(L2) since there are L possible values for the
hash functions f and g in equation (1). Furthermore, the detection of atoms
could easily be parallelized to make the computation faster and values of L
significantly larger than L = 1, 000 as considered in this paper would also have
negative effects on the time needed for performing the linkage between two
databases (note that in the large scale study reported in [13] a Bloom filter
length of only 100 was considered). Thus, the most time consuming step in our
cryptanalysis should be the optimization algorithm presented in subsection 4.3.
Indeed, in the chosen parameter setup this procedure took about 402 minutes
on a notebook with 2.80 GHz Intel R© Core running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.
To sum up, we do not recommend the usage of Bloom filters built from one
or more identifiers, generated with the double hashing scheme, in applications
where high security standards are required. However, we applied our attack in
a very special scenario, because the generated databases were encrypted using
the double hashing scheme. Thus, there are options for an improvement of the
setting.
For example Niedermeyer et al. [11] proposed several methods such as fake
injections, salting or randomly selected hash values to harden the Bloom filters.
Hence, we are confident that methods like those proposed by Niedermeyer et
al. show promise in the prevention of attacks like the one presented in this
paper.
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